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As a technical term in the humanities ‘historicity’ (Geschichtlichkeit) has under-
gone a shift of meaning over time. In philosophy the term probably occurs for 
the first time in Hegel’s philosophy. In his lectures on the philosophy of religion 
Hegel applied it with reference to the theological dogma that truth has come 
into existence in time and subsequently influenced the course of events signifi-
cantly. The incarnation of God was an event that marked a new epoch, distin-
guishing temporal change in the human world by bestowing upon it historical 
character. As is well known, in Hegel religion and philosophy share the same 
object but they differ as regards the form in which the object is addressed. 
Whereas in religion God is addressed through worship and cult, in philosophy 
the idea of God is transformed into the notion of the absolute (Hegel (1971a) 
123). The change of form from worship to cognition distinguishes modernity 
from the Middle Ages. In this respect historicity refers to the appearance of a 
new relation of man to himself and to the truth. Denoting here this external 
influence on the foundations of philosophy, ‘historicity’ comes to characterize 
a certain condition of philosophical knowledge of the truth: that philosophy 
from its very beginning in pre-Christian culture had the absolute, the eternal 
truth, as the object of knowledge, whereas in the age of Christianity it had to 
seek truth on the conditions of historical changeability. This means that the 
appearance of truth in history, Revelation, caused a break that separated the 
history of philosophy into two main epochs: ancient and modern (Hegel: Ger-
man) philosophy. Within these epochs there are phases (Stufen) which preserve 
a basic continuity in the development of philosophy1. 
 
1 See Hegel (1971a) 123 ff. for his division of the history of philosophy in epochs, periods and 
phases. 
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Even though it originated in Hegel’s philosophy, historicity as a technical 
term in philosophy is predominantly associated with so-called continental phi-
losophy in which it has made tradition. A number of leading currents in the 20th 
century German and French philosophy integrate the historical aspect in their 
systematic research. Historicity means that philosophical questions and prob-
lems must be addressed with the awareness of the historicity of philosophical 
rationality. Hegel is both fellow player and opponent in this tradition. Already 
in the second half of the 19th century, at the time when the criticism of Hegel 
sat in, not only his notorious ‘system’ was refuted. A criticism of his history of 
philosophy was undertaken by predominant figures as Dilthey and Graf Yorck 
who partly rejected the metaphysics and speculative method of Hegel’s philos-
ophy, partly applied his philosophy in a constructive way by developing an on-
tology on the basis of historicity as an essential feature of knowledge2. Never-
theless, it turned out to be Heidegger’s analysis of the fundamental temporality 
of human existence in Sein und Zeit (1927) and Gadamer’s historical specifica-
tion of Heidegger’s philosophy of existence in Wahrheit und Methode (1960) 
which became central to the hermeneutic tradition of the late 20th century3. 
Gadamer carried on the project of historicism developed by Dilthey. Combin-
ing it with Heidegger’s idea of “die geschichtliche Seinsweise des menschlichen 
Daseins” he founded a theory of the historicity of human understanding on the 
basis of the temporality of human existence (Renthe-Fink (1974) 405). 
This paper focuses on Hegel’s idea of historicity and its implications for 
the connection between philosophy and its history. More specifically, the aim 
is to examine the primary, i.e. epoch-making, external impacts on the develop-
ment of philosophy. Hegel holds the view that history of philosophy is based 
on a development in metaphysics (‘metaphysics’ in its Aristotelian sense) to-
wards adequate knowledge of the absolute idea. This claim presupposes the 
autonomy of reason and implies a teleological view of the course of the history 
of philosophy. However, the idea of philosophy as an immanent process that 
develops according to internal criteria, makes it interesting to attempt to illumi-
nate the character and significance of the external event which according to 
 
2 See Briefwechsel (1923/2011) 
3 See Renthe-Fink (1974) for a brief but informative account of the development of the concept 
of historicity. 
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Hegel has influenced the development of philosophy too. ‘Historicity’ in He-
gel’s sense covers exactly this external aspect of the development: the occur-
rence of radical changes which initiate new departures in the course of philos-
ophy. In this paper two epoch-making events in particular are presented which 
in Hegel’s view break through the otherwise immanent, problem-oriented de-
velopment and become an integrate element of what Hegel calls the philosoph-
ical science. Concerning the relation of philosophy to its history, Hegel states: 
dass unsere Philosophie wesentlich nur im Zusammenhange mit vorhergehender zur 
Existenz gekommen (…) ist; und der verlauf der Geschichte ist es, welcher uns nicht 
das Werden fremder Dinge, sondern dies unser Werden, das Werden unserer Wissenschaft dar-
stellt. (Hegel (1971a) 22).  
Finally, I suggest that Hegel seems to overlook that the radical significance 
of external influences did not just have historical consequences in the form of 
epoch-making events. It also implied a change in the epistemological conditions 
of knowledge. Certain new intuitions, a priory principles of arguments, appear 
in the ‘thoughtful consideration’ which distinguishes philosophical cognition 
from the beginning of the modern world. Hence philosophy began to operate 
with ideas and principles which differ more or less from the principles in the 
pre-modern world. 
 
2. Hegel on philosophy in its history. The ‘old prejudice’. 
It is fair to say that Hegel’s concept of historicity can be summed up in the 
following lapidary statement, “daβ das Studium der Geschichte der Philosophie 
Studium der Philosophie selbst ist” (op.cit. 49). With these words Hegel begins 
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy in whose rather extensive introduction he 
presents his concept of philosophy. Provided – as he states – that the history 
of philosophy demonstrates the very becoming of philosophical science (op.cit. 
22), the beginning of the historical presentation implies a problematic circle that 
needs a justification. The circle consists in Hegel’s in advance stating and using 
a concept of philosophy which is not substantiated until the whole following 
historical presentation is complete. But the circle, while presupposing what is 
to be proved, is inevitable and necessary, partly in order to delimit the presen-
tation from other scientific fields, partly to be able to discern and retain the 
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philosophical substance of the often rather varying philosophical systems over 
time. Otherwise the historian of philosophy risks being led astray in plays of 
thought (Gedankenspiel, op.cit. 50) like in many old, doxographic presentations: 
Instead of moving forward with the overall idea of philosophy in mind they 
deliver superficial presentations of a number of arbitrary opinions (ibid.).  
With a slightly hidden reference to a widespread sceptic attitude to philos-
ophy in his own age Hegel emphasizes the necessity of commencing the study 
of philosophy with an a priori concept of philosophy. The pitfall which several 
early presentations fell into by including tall stories, biographical data and 
doubtful information, left them with an unscientific outlook. The same holds 
for presentations which do not distinguish philosophy from other fields of 
knowledge (op.cit. 15 ff.). Presentations of opinions may pass on historically 
correct statements without containing truth: Allegorically Hegel says: without 
being able to master philosophical method and discern the philosophical sub-
stance of different texts, one is like an animal which obviously hears the tones 
of music but does not comprehend the harmony, i.e. the music (op.cit. 17). In 
order to keep the presentation on the right track and to understand the philo-
sophical substance in its sentences, Hegel suggests the need for an organ for 
speculative thinking. The concept of philosophy must be stated in advance, at 
least in a tentative definition, in order to secure from the outset, the safe course 
through the labyrinthine manifold of texts. 
But also, the regular doxographic presentation of a well-defined field of 
study does not escape the mistrust with which philosophy can be met. The mu-
tually conflicting claims of various philosophical systems concerning the same 
subject-matter make it difficult to discern a progression in the history of phi-
losophy. If the systems are to be studied not just as a history of ideas that ex-
press the personal world views of their authors (Weltanschauungen); if, on the 
contrary, their claims to contain truth are taken seriously, they fail due to the 
Pyrrhonean argument: several well justified but mutually conflicting claims can-
not lead to a positive, epistemically productive, conclusion. Thus, though not 
without problems it is still necessary to lay a criterion at the basis of the presen-
tation of the history of philosophy. This is not just in order to delimit philoso-
phy from other scientific studies but also to have an epistemic presupposition 
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for considering the history of philosophy as a progress in knowledge. Faced 
with the sceptic argument above, Hegel is very well aware that this assumption 
is problematic. An assumption which is immune to the Pyrrhonean argument 
can obviously not be a certain doctrine or any dogmatic presupposition what-
soever. The basic assumption must be so minimal that even the sceptic must 
accept it. And yet it must contain enough method to fulfill the demands neces-
sary for a justification of the possibility of philosophical cognition. 
It is not surprising that Hegel finds the necessary criterion at the beginning 
of philosophy in ancient Greece. It is the minimal rational condition which par-
ticipants in a philosophical dialogue implicitly accept when commencing to dis-
cuss philosophical problems: they acknowledge the authority of ‘thoughtful 
consideration’4. More precisely, it is the Platonic distinction between knowledge 
(episteme) and opinion (doxa) worked out through the intellectual struggle fought 
by Socrates with the relativism and subjectivism of the Sophists (ibid. 32). Un-
dogmatic with regard to metaphysical claims, Hegel is content to appeal to the 
old prejudice (ibid. 33) that already the insistence to consider a statement rationally 
presupposes the distinction between true and false which makes the basis of a 
critical examination of that statement. Just this one epistemic principle that 
truth exists and can be reached through rational thinking, must be a presuppo-
sition for all productive philosophical practice. Hegel justifies this claim by re-
ferring to the fact that a rejection of this premise would imply a refutation of 
philosophical discussions. Also, the sceptic is bound to consent to this demand 
of justification. He must recognise the universal validity of arguments. By re-
jecting this premise, the sceptic philosopher sticks to subjective vanity and ex-
cludes reason and philosophy. Hegel says: 
Ich appelliere hierbei vorläufig an das alte Vorurteil, daβ im Wissen Wahrheit sei, daβ 
man aber vom Wahren nur insofern wisse, als man nachdenke, nicht so, wie man gehe 
und stehe; daβ die Wahrheit nicht erkannt werde im unmittelbaren Wahrnehmen, An-
schauen (…) sondern nur durch die Mühe des Denkens. (ibid. 33). 
As historians who aim at the notion of philosophy through a presentation 
of its history, we must begin without metaphysical foundation. But by virtue of 
our concept of philosophical reasoning we know at least which areas and 
 
4 I translate Hegel’s German words for philosophical cognition, ‘denkende Vernunft’ and ‘be-
greifendes Erkennen’ into ‘thoughtful consideration’, cf. Hegel (1971a) 20; 30.  
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problems belong to philosophical science. We also know that there is a truth 
about the solution to the problems of philosophy and finally that “thoughtful 
consideration” (ibid. 20) contains a method to judge about them5. - However, 
in order to refute the objections raised by the sceptic, it still remains for us to 
demonstrate that mutually conflicting systems do not finally lead to a dead end 
but can be philosophically productive. This must be so if the history of philos-
ophy shall have the status of the becoming of the philosophical science (ibid. 
22), of the unfolding of truth in time. But the claim that conflicts between phil-
osophical systems are productive, constitutes the very core of Hegel’s dialectical 
form of thinking. However, this is developed elsewhere in Hegel’s works. 
 
3.What it means that philosophy has a history. On anachronisms. 
If on the one hand the study of the history of philosophy presupposes at least 
a minimal concept of philosophical rationality, on the other hand philosophy is 
also historically concrete and thereby subject to change. By defining philosophy 
as thoughtful consideration, Hegel means that it is essential to truth to appear in the 
activity of the thought, incarnate in an individual subject who belongs to the 
historical world. Present as the object of thinking, truth is thus not a distant and 
inaccessible subject matter. On the contrary, it exists always in a specific shape 
of a philosophical system determined by its age. As a “child of his age” (Hegel 
(1970c) 26) the philosopher is thus a product of a certain cultural arrangement. 
His thoughts present themselves on the conditions of his age despite the uni-
versal character of its logical form. It is obviously this cultural and relative as-
pect which gives philosophy its shape of a series of single systems unfolding in 
time and forming philosophy as history. Hegel’s famous statement in his Philos-
ophy of Right that “philosophy is its age conceived in thoughts” (Hegel (1970c) 
26) gives it an extra historical twist.  
However, despite its historical character philosophy is not just an ideolog-
ical reflection of political and social interests. Reason is not determined by 
 
5 At this place Hegel does not determine the peculiarity of philosophy compared to the empirical 
sciences though the development of philosophy as the “mother of sciences” from Antiquity until 
the present age testifies a significant change of the idea of philosophy. The use of the term 
‘speculative’ here seems to be a sufficient indication of the difference between philosophy and 
the sciences, cf. Hegel (1971a) 17.  
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external circumstances. On the contrary, through its own rational conditions, 
philosophy grasps the essence of the age and expresses it in concepts. It reflects 
the culture of the age and follows it – so to speak – intellectually back to its 
origin in the spirit of the age. The consequence of the double relation which 
philosophy has to its age is this: As an activity which aims at truth it transcends 
the historical conditions. But as a particular system it is limited to the age as 
well. The former rational aspect marks the origin of philosophy in pre-Socratic 
philosophy which insisted on the autonomy of thought, logos. The emergence 
of philosophy denoted the initiation of investigations in which concepts were 
formed to replace mythological ideas and images. The elements of nature in 
pre-Socratic philosophy: water, air, fire, logos, were all anticipations of the uni-
versal concept which had not yet quite been liberated from its sensible-mytho-
logical robes and achieved a conceptual form6. The refutation of and often even 
hostility towards religion explicit in parts of pre-Socratic philosophy stemmed 
from the new experience of reason that appeared at the time of the origin of 
philosophy. ‘Logos’ is a form of cognition essentially different from ‘mythos’. 
The historian of philosophy must reflect on the context of his object be-
cause it determines which questions are reasonable to pose and which criticism 
can reasonably be raised against a past philosophy. Hegel rejects his contempo-
rary colleague Flatt for applying the terms theism and atheism to characterise 
the position of Thales (ibid. 60). The idea of a personal God belongs to a much 
later period and originates in Jewish religion. Flatt’s consideration is anachro-
nistic and deficient on that point. In defense of Hegel’s indirect emphasis on 
the significance of the religious and cultural context for philosophical concepts 
one could also raise criticism against the materialist interpretation of the pre-
Socratic philosophy of nature. As mentioned, the concepts formed by the Io-
nian philosophers had a sensible quality7. The sensible feature that clung to the 
 
6 Thought had not yet become for itself, i.e. aware of itself as such. This only happens in the So-
cratic period. The transition from pre-Socratic cosmology to ‘logos’, conceptual thinking, this 
“swing-over to the subject as part of consideration” became essential to philosophy from Plato. 
Cf. Copleston (1985) 81. 
7 In Eleatic philosophy, at least in Parmenides and Zeno, the ‘universal’ is freed from sensible 
shape. But its abstract character as being (to on) expresses just the still indeterminate character 
which is typical for pure thought in its initial phase. The concept still lacks the further reflec-
tions that traditions gives it.  
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universal concepts in the form of the elements of nature, stemmed from the 
historical fact that reasoning had not yet been purified from mythological fea-
tures. In accord with Hegel’s view it is fair to say that because of the historical 
and cultural situation of the Ionian philosophers between the mythological and 
the rational age, the term ‘hylozoism’ characterises their positions more ade-
quately than the term materialism which has modern scientific connotations. 
 
4. The history of philosophy as tradition and development. 
In order to clarify the relation of the history of philosophy to philosophy Hegel 
finds it necessary to pose the question: “Why does philosophy have a history?” 
(ibid. 15). It is notable that Hegel thinks that philosophy necessarily has a his-
tory. Whereas the experiential sciences are dependent on empirical research, 
philosophy is the science of “the nature of things, man and God” (ibid. 14). 
Philosophy is the essential knowledge of the same objects as investigated by the 
sciences but it is acquired by virtue of a higher, more general and conceptual 
reflection on the scientific knowledge. The object of philosophy is the 
knowledge of all things and their interrelatedness8. It is metaphysics based on, but 
not identical with empirical physics. This distinction allows to say that philosophy 
as metaphysics has one and the same object throughout its history though the 
empirical part has more or less been taken over by the sciences. Since meta-
physics precedes experiential science both historically and with regard to higher 
rank, it would be a mistake to explain the development of philosophy as a result 
of the progress in scientific knowledge. On the contrary, Hegel considers the 
production of empirical knowledge as a resource to the answer to substantial, 
metaphysical questions posed by philosophy. Philosophy is historical in the 
sense that it is a process in which one and the same object is determined more 
and more substantially by virtue of the scientific facts. The extension of empir-
ical knowledge is one thing. Another thing is that knowledge is only complete 
when the metaphysical questions are answered completely9.  
 
8 Dieter Henrich has called metaphysics after Kant “Gedanken eines Abschlusses” just in that 
respect, cf. Henrich (1987) 13. 
9 On Hegel’s idea of the relation between philosophy and natural sciences, see Hegel (1970a) 
15, §246 A. In the introduction to the philosophy of nature he states that philosophical science 
has empirical physics as its presupposition and condition. 
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The metaphysical truth is not itself subject to historical change, but the 
subjective acquisition of this truth is limited to the conditions of the age to 
which the philosopher belongs. The development of philosophy takes place 
gradually. Therefore, it appears over time as a unity in the shape of the conti-
nuity of its history through which the object, the absolute, becomes determi-
nate. Its history is thus not just an accumulation of material. On the contrary, 
as Hegel says: “Hier ist das Extensivste auch das Intensivste” (ibid. 47). This 
means that the conceptuality developed through the progress of increasing 
complexity makes the object gradually clearer and more substantial as 
knowledge. The balance between continuity and discretion in history is tradition 
which literally means that philosophical systems are handed down through his-
tory (Überlieferung). Regardless of the awareness of its practitioners, philosophy 
always unfolds within a tradition where theories from the past are acquired and 
exposed to critique and renewed on the conditions of a new age. ‘Historicity’ 
does not just refer to the past or to the moment of an event. It means that 
something is perishable as an empirical fact but preserved over time, for exam-
ple in the sense of exemplary works that make an epoch by setting a new agenda 
and therefore are present in later works. ‘Historicity’ covers the ambiguity of a 
piece of work which has entered into the theories of a later age as a constitutive 
moment. One obvious example is classical rationalism and empiricism. The two 
mutually conflicting positions or traditions are sublated (aufgehoben) in the phi-
losophy of Kant: they belong to the past but they are also preserved in Kant. 
Kant’s so-called Criticism has unified the two conflicting positions by turning 
their genuine insights into elements of his new position. His synthesis demon-
strates the central point in historicity: that the past is actual in the present. 
Philosophy considered from a historical perspective is tradition, but ex-
actly in the sense of the activity in which the past is passed on into the present 
when new systems are construed. Thus, provided that the philosopher is aware 
of his role as a communicator of tradition in his work he also contributes to the 
continuity of the historical movement of philosophy. The historical awareness 
of this process thus emphasizes the progression in philosophy even in the sense 
that the philosopher takes part in the ongoing unfolding of the truth, i.e. of the 
notion of philosophy. Furthermore, as a consequence of this it appears that the 
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temporal movement – the change of philosophy over time – also contains a 
non-temporal movement in the very subject matter: History turns out to be a 
development through which philosophical truth actualises itself, i.e. becomes 
manifest. History and elaboration of truth are two sides of the same coin. 
 
5. The historical conditions of philosophical thought. 
The fact that philosophy is always situated in a context implies that historical 
awareness is a necessary condition which guarantees that arguments are based 
on up-to-date principles. For example, it is not evident in a logical sense that 
slavery is wrong. But the modern age embraces values like universal freedom 
and human dignity and they must form the basis of a practical philosophy that 
excludes slavery. According to Hegel the knowledge and recognition of basic 
universal principles and concepts are historically conditioned. The demand for 
universal freedom in moral and political respect only makes sense in a modern 
age. But this view does not lead to sheer relativism. The knowledge of universal 
freedom and dignity as essential features of human nature must have reached a 
historical level where autonomy in the sense of the ability to administer one’s 
freedom is ready to be accepted as a base for practical philosophy. In Hegel’s 
words: humanity must have come to knowledge of man’s essential freedom. 
There is thus an inner connection between moral concepts and the spirit of a 
historical epoch. Moral and political philosophy whose problems are formu-
lated without adequate awareness of their historical context are liable to mistake 
logical, intuitive evidence for the evidence due to the spirit of the particular age. 
The history of philosophy conceived as development is an irreversible 
process. Platonism and Aristotelianism in the modern age are strictly speaking 
views which express lack of historical awareness and self-knowledge (ibid. 65). 
Conversely, as already mentioned, philosophical systems of the past are always 
implicitly at work in the philosophy of the present by virtue of tradition. Every 
philosophical investigation is not just new. It is a more or less conscious inher-
itance and further development of the philosophy of the past. To Hegel this 
means that to practice philosophical research on a high level must imply the 
highest possible, historical self-transparency. Philosophy must be conducted in 
awareness of the tradition within which it develops. The double task of working 
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with historical awareness and being contemporary with one’s own age presup-
poses a correct concept of history. Theories of the past are not definitively 
brought to an end. Philosophy unfolds in the point of intersection between 
tradition and renewal. 
The awareness of the presence of tradition in philosophical thought im-
plies that philosophical positions and arguments of the past are integrated into 
the theoretical frameworks of contemporary research. This is important, not 
only in order to promote continuity and unity in the course of philosophy but 
also in order to secure a high scientific level of philosophical research. The for-
mulation of a philosophical problem presupposes familiarity with analyses, con-
cepts, theories and arguments that are contained in the tradition. On the philo-
sophical system in this historical respect Hegel says:  
In ihr muβ alles, was zunächst als ein Vergangenes erscheint, aufbewahrt und enthal-
ten, sie (the philosophical system, pw) muβ selbst ein Spiegel der ganzen Geschichte 
sein (ibid. 61).  
Philosophy makes progress when it does not constantly attempt to start 
all over again but is aware of its historical conditions in tradition. Therefore, it 
is in the productive conflict between these orientations: continuity and break 
that philosophy not only changes but develops. 
As mentioned earlier, the progression in the history of philosophy pre-
sents a gradually more substantial appearance of truth. However not in the 
sense of a step by step approximation to the truth far away in a distant future. 
Philosophy of the past is not necessarily refuted because it is false. The quality 
of a significant philosophy of the past consists in the contribution it gives to 
the common advance in knowledge. As such it possesses a relative truth. As 
mentioned earlier, Hegel thinks that philosophy has been in touch with truth 
since its birth in ancient Greece. The notion of being (to on) in Parmenides and 
the notion of ‘logos’ in Heraclitus’ theory constitute conceptual aspects of the 
essence of all change in the universe. In Hegel’s words this means:  
die Vernunft erkennt das eine in dem anderen, daβ in dem einem sein 
Anderes enthalten ist, - und so ist das All, das Absolute zu bestimmen als 
das Werden (ibid. 325).  
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According to Hegel the absolute or the Notion (Idee) already addressed by 
Heraclitus and Parmenides is indetermined and abstract in the form of their 
ideas. But the absolute must appear so in the beginning of philosophy because it 
still lacks the conceptual complexity which further systematic elaboration adds 
to it. And in addition to this: mythology which originated in the mythological 
mind of images yet incapable of abstract thinking could not satisfy the demands 
reason makes on a theory which shall count as metaphysical knowledge. Only 
when reason becomes aware of itself in its reflection in the mind, a field of 
metaphysical research is established, namely the characteristic level of philo-
sophical conceptuality which gradually, through generations of philosophers, 
develops to more substantial and adequate knowledge. Hegel says:  
Den Anfang macht das, was an sich ist, das Unmittelbare, Abstrakte, Allgemeine, was 
noch nicht fortgeschritten ist. Das Konkretere, Reichere ist das Spätere; das Erste ist 
das Ärmere an Bestimmungen (ibid. 59). 
 
6. Temporal and non-temporal aspects of the experience of the historical element in philosoph-
ical thought. 
The historical study of philosophy is obviously a study of thoughts from past 
epochs. But in the active acquisition of these thoughts the scholar enters into a 
community with philosophy across time. This is tradition. Sharing a common 
philosophical problem with tradition he becomes contemporary with his pre-
decessors in thought. The development of philosophy turns out to be a joint 
enterprise in which philosophy develops by entering into itself - becomes ein In-
sich-gehen – in line with the production of a more adequate conceptual complex-
ity of the problem in question. The merging which thus happens between the 
development of philosophical depth and its history gives Hegel reason to state, 
“daβ die Aufeinanderfolge der Systeme der Philosophie in der Geschichte 
diesselbe ist als die Aufeinanderfolge in der logischen Ableitung der Be-
griffsbestimmungen der Idee” (ibid. 49). The historical perspective differs from 
the conceptual development of the problem by an increase of the amount of 
philosophical systems. Material accumulates in the course of history. The inten-
sification – the growing complexity - of the problem implies that some theories, 
drafts and inadequate concepts are left to the oblivion of the past while 
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substantial knowledge is preserved and integrated in later theories. The essence 
of the subject-matter is thus preserved to form constitutive moments of later 
theories. Hegel’s original word for this, sublation (aufheben), means that the ex-
tensification which happens through the unfolding of a manifold also becomes 
an intensification in the sense of an increasing richness of meaning10. 
It turns out that Hegel’s concept of the historical element in philosophy 
leads us beyond the mere external chronological order. The historical object 
displays a non-temporal element. This element is not just the fix point necessary 
for the structure of time in general. It also contains the substantial meaning of 
the subject-matter which manifests along with its unfolding over time. This is 
because the view of the history of philosophy as a development contains a spe-
cific speculative element significant for Hegel’s idea of an internal relation be-
tween philosophy and its history: When Hegel focuses on the intensification of 
meaning which is brought about by philosophizing with awareness of tradition, 
he discovers that the thoughtful consideration through which the scholar con-
nects the past with the present is experienced as an intellectual unification with 
the living, universal spirit. It is fair to say that the historical awareness leads to a 
recognition of two aspects of the historical experience: a reversal from object to 
subject and then to the universal in which both are unified: In the discovery that 
the past object is an essential feature of the present object the subject who phi-
losophises with historical awareness recognises that his own thinking is con-
nected with the historical element through the present object. In other words: 
His speculative absorption in the present object with the awareness of its his-
torical genesis is at the same time his absorption in himself as cognising subject. 
In this contemplation he recognises his connectedness with the universal es-
sence of philosophy itself. It is the experience which the subject makes of his 
subject-matter and of himself and of the unification of both by participating in 
the ‘thoughtful consideration’ that also constitutes the identity of the whole 
history of philosophy. The historical character of the past philosophy – in He-
gel’s speculative sense – has thus the significance for the history of philosophy 
 
10 It is an essential feature of Hegel’s dialectic that development has a substantial meaning. Cf. 
his Wissenschaft der Logik in which he undertakes a dialectical deduction of a complex system 
of concepts as a process through which the single object of the whole logical investigation, Be-
ing, determines itself and finally results in the Notion (Idee). 
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“daβ wir in ihr, ob sie gleich Geschichte ist, es doch nicht mit Vergangenem zu 
tun haben. Der Inhalt dieser Geschichte sind die wissenschaftlichen Produkte 
der Vernünftigkeit, und diese sind nicht ein Vergängliches” (ibid. 57). What 
unifies the past with the present is the ‘universal spirit’ in which whoever phi-
losophizes with historical awareness participates. It is thoughtful consideration, 
not just as formal reasoning but as the conceptual thinking which increases with 
regard to complexity and depth of intension. In metaphysical respect the aim 
of the study is to cognise one and the same truth, namely the notion (die Idee). This 
truth is not transcendent but it appears vividly present in the external form of 
thinking (ibid. 52). Whoever studies philosophy with historical awareness, ex-
periences himself as participant in the life of the universal spirit in which abso-
lute truth becomes gradually more manifest with time11. 
The chain that links philosophical systems into a chronological order thus 
reflects the genesis of philosophy. But the study of the history of philosophy is 
also the way in which human self-consciousness achieves self-knowledge as a 
rational being and at the same time experiences itself as a historical being. 
Though this holds good in any possible extension of the historical horizon, our 
intellectual-spiritual make-up in particular becomes an experience which we 
have of ourselves through the study of the history of philosophy, insofar as we 
transcend the merely temporal dimension by reconsidering the thoughts of the 
past. By participating in tradition, we address the same ‘eternal’ subject-matter 
as past philosophers did.  
The study of the history of philosophy is not simply acquisition of histor-
ical knowledge for the sake of scholarship. On the contrary, motivated by a 
search for knowledge, the study is an existential engagement that provides his-
torical self-knowledge. In Hegel’s words: The ‘self-aware reason’ that charac-
terises modern man: 
 
 
11 Husserl expresses a similar historical self-experience in Krisis where he assigns a certain vo-
cation to the philosopher: He ought to work as a “Funktionär der Menschheit” by raising him-
self to historical awareness. It belongs to philosophical method to undertake an intellectual his-
torical reflection back to the origin of the rationality of European humanity in order to form a 
concept of this rationality, so that we – the reflecting subjects – can formulate a clear notion of 
rational humanity (Vernunftmenschheit) and make it an aim for our striving for knowledge, cf. 
Husserl (1962) 13; 15 
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ist nicht unmittelbar entstanden und nur aus dem Boden der Gegenwart gewachsen, 
sondern es ist dies wesentlich in ihm, eine Erbschaft und näher das Resultat der Arbeit 
aller vorhergegangenen Generationen des Menschengeschlechts zu sein. (Hegel 
(1971a) 21).  
One discovers that the past is not simply not existing. This is because, on the 
one side as ‘self-aware reason’ we are the result of a historical development that 
contains the work of philosophical spirit across time. On the other side, the 
philosophers of the past are our contemporaries, we are joined with them by con-
sidering one and the same philosophical notion which develops through and 
unifies all epochs in the history of philosophy. For example, reading a dialogue 
by Plato I become present in the timeless thought of the subject-matter by ac-
complishing the reasoning conducted by Socrates too when he unfolded his 
argument. The historical distance sinks below the limit of my awareness when 
I join the universal reasoning. But historicity is also experienced when dealing 
with the subject-matter we realise that Plato’s conceptual framework is inade-
quate when viewed from the perspective of our more elaborate, modern phi-
losophy. The historical distance thus appears on the systematic level as the dif-
ference between more and less adequate frameworks of the past and theories 
formed in present philosophy. One could venture to say: we belong to the past; 
it is the history of our genesis as intellectual beings. But the past belongs to us 
too; it is at play in the vivid reasoning in the constantly present philosophical 
activity. Or in Hegel’s words: 
 Was wir sind, sind wir zugleich geschichtlich, oder genauer: wie in dem, was in dieser 
region des Denkens (sich findet), das Vergangene nur die eine Seite ist, so ist in dem, 
was wir sind, das gemeinschaftliche Unvergängliche unzertrennt mit dem, daβ wir ges-
chichtlich sind, verknüpft. (ibid. 21). 
 
7. Two concepts of historicity: The origin of philosophy and the emergence of the modern age 
In the preceding account I have treated the notion of historicity with reference 
to the internal chronological coherence between philosophical systems showing 
how the development of philosophy can be considered a unitary enterprise 
throughout its history. From this notion I have also extracted some methodo-
logical implications for doing philosophy with historical awareness. Below a 
treatment is given of Hegel’s specific application of the concept of historicity 
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on two events of substantial significance for the history of philosophy. I suggest 
there is a conflict in Hegel’s theory: Whereas the idea of development in the 
Aristotelian sense that Hegel subscribes to, i.e. the idea of a change from po-
tentiality (Ansichsein) to actuality (Fürsichsein), implies that philosophy develops 
through history according to own internal criteria in problems and method (rea-
soning), Hegel also applies ‘historicity’ to denote an external influence on the 
development. The two main epochs, ‘die Griechische Philosophie’ and ‘die 
Germanische Philosophie’, emerge as a consequence of two distinct epoch-
making events outside the domain of philosophy (ibid. 131)12. 
Hegel applied the term Geschichtlichkeit for the first time to explain the 
origin of philosophy in ancient Greece (ibid. 175). He considered the political 
independence which the Greek people had won through struggle, i.e. the expe-
rience of themselves as a free people on own soil, to be the foundation of the 
freedom of thought. About the relation between political conditions and the 
origin of philosophy Hegel says:  
… zum Hervortreten der Philosophie gehört Bewuβtsein der Freiheit, so muss dem 
Volke, wo Philosophie beginnt, dies Prinzip zugrundeliegen; nach der praktischen Seite 
hängt damit zusammen, daβ wirkliche Freiheit, politische Freiheit aufblühe. (ibid. 116). 
The idea of political freedom as a condition of the emancipation from 
mythological ideas is thus a particular ancient Greek phenomenon. As is well 
known, the origin of philosophy in Greece had socio-economic conditions, not 
just in the sense that certain privileges provided leisure time for the free citizens 
to devote time to theoretical reflection: After the Persian wars the political au-
tonomy of the Athenian people also became the spiritual emancipation from 
the authority of religious ideas, mythology (ibid. 115-117; Johansen (1994) 13, 
113). The inner life of contemplation (bios theoretikos) is an occupation which 
 
12 Actually, according to Hegel’s theory the history of philosophy consists of three periods, but 
the second, the Middle Ages, does not constitute an independent period. It is rather, according to 
Hegel, a preparation for the third, the Modern Age. Medieval philosophy presupposed Christi-
anity which brought with it the seeds of a significant change in the European spirit and thus also 
in philosophy. In the Middle Ages thought was occupied by contemplating this new spiritual 
substance of Christianity “bis er (der Gedanke, pw) wieder sich als freien Grund und Quelle der 
Wahrheit erkennt” (ibid. 131). This means that only from the break-through of the Modern Age 
has philosophy regained its previous freedom. And forming the modern world it brings the 
Christian truth with it into its own fields of research. This changes the foundations of philoso-
phy significantly. More about that below. 
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only recognises and follows the authority of reason. ‘Historicity’ refers to the 
internal connection which the Greek drew between philosophical activity and 
the remembrance of their freedom on own soil, their domestic life:  
in dieser existierenden Heimatlichkeit selbst (…) in diesem Geiste des vorgestellten 
Beisichselbstseins in seiner physikalischen, bürgerlichen, rechtlichen, sittlichen, 
politischen Existenz, in diesem Character der freien, schönen Geschichtlichkeit (…) 
liegt auch der Keim der denkenden Freiheit und so der Character, daβ bei ihnen die 
Philosphie entstanden ist. (ibid. 175). 
Though well aware that ancient Greece is an epoch of the past Hegel still 
emphasized the philosophical awakening of the Greeks as a metaphor for the 
idea of self-aware, philosophical reason: To do philosophy is exactly to be at 
home in oneself; it is the independent and free engagement of thought with 
itself: “Wie die Griechen bei sich zu Hause, so ist die Philosophie eben dies: bei 
sich zu Hause sein, heimatlich bei sich” (ibid.). - And one could add: accord-
ingly, the historian recognises that the decline of philosophy in late Antiquity is 
connected with general scepticism. Because the city state had lost its political 
autonomy in the Hellenist age the possibilities of philosophy had been reduced 
considerably13. But it is Hegel’s point that once originated in the Athenian peo-
ple philosophy continued to live forth in history and became a common prop-
erty of humanity. To us who belong to a much later epoch homeliness in rela-
tion to philosophical activity means that thought is at home in its own sphere. 
It is self-aware reasoning. 
The second time Hegel applies the concept of historicity is in relation to 
Christianity. The emergence of the Modern Age, the second great epoch in phi-
losophy, is related to a religious event. Revelation marked a radical change in 
the self-understanding of man. But not until the Protestant Reformation did 
 
13 For example, the highest principle in Stoic philosophy is abstract freedom: The loss of ‘ethi-
cal life’ (Sittlichkeit) in the previously autonomous city state forced the individual back into his 
own mind in order to preserve at least his personal integrity on the ground of own ethical princi-
ples. The particular elements in the ‘ethical life’ of the city state had disappeared (Hegel 
(1971b) 293-294). Roman Stoicism was based on the experience of an outer dead world, a state 
of despair which forced the philosopher to withdraw into the inner life of his own thoughts. The 
connection in late Antiquity between outer political conditions and the reduction of the possibil-
ity of philosophy is expressed by Hegel thus: “Das Denken ist abstrakt bei sich als totes Erstar-
ren und passiv nach aussen” (ibid. 402). A similar refuge to the inner life of the mind was also 
prevalent in the Epicurean philosophy. However, Epicureanism based its wisdom on sensation 
and man’s sensual nature. 
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this substantial significance of Christianity become manifest. Only in Luther’s 
renunciation of the authority of the church was Christianity expounded as the 
messenger of the “free spirit” that founded the Modern Age (Hegel (1970d) 
496-497). “Im modernen Prinzip wird so das Subjekt für sich frei, der Mensch 
als Mensch frei” (ibid. 127). According to Hegel’s philosophical framework the 
appearance of God in the shape of man was an objective, historical event whose 
idea had radical consequences for the self-understanding of the individual who 
appropriated it. The incarnation, God’s descent to man, raised man to a 
knowledge of his higher dignity. Whereas to the Greeks the object of philoso-
phy was conceived of as the notion of the cosmic order, in the Modern Age 
philosophical reason is considered that which distinguishes consciousness as 
spirit (ibid. 123-124). This means: modern consciousness is based on the con-
viction that thought as thought contains the divine principle. Due to its divinity 
this principle is the basis of human freedom because it expresses itself in man’s 
experience of himself as substantially different from and independent of nature. 
The incarnation of God thus initiated the historical development of modern 
self-consciousness. This knowledge which the Greeks according to Hegel did 
not have, implied furthermore that the individual gradually came to understand 
himself as subject, as carrier of freedom.  
The new knowledge spread to become the general conviction that free-
dom should constitute the basis of an active shaping of history towards more 
freedom. In Hegel’s word, modern self-knowledge consisted in the Christian 
idea “den Begriff der wahrhaften Freiheit nicht nur zur religiösen Substanz zu 
haben, sondern auch in der Welt aus dem subjektiven Selbstbewuβtsein frei zu 
produzieren” (Hegel (1970d) 413). This means that Christianity marked the op-
posite movement compared to the Neoplatonic ideal of knowledge as a spiritual 
ascent and identification with the divine, in which ancient idealism reached its 
climax (Hegel (1971a) 126-127). By contrast, historicity in the modern sense 
meant, “das Christus ein wirklicher, dieser Mensch gewesen (ist), womit der 
Geist eben in dieser Geschichte expliziert sei, als innige Vereinigung von Idee 
und geschichtlicher Gestalt” (Renthe-Fink (1974) 405). Transformed into phil-
osophical form, the epoch-making religious event had the substantial conse-
quence that for the first time in history the individual began to understand his 
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freedom and eternal dignity (Hegel (1970b) 302), and that this truth, revealed 
to him, is meant to be realised in the world. The fact that the individual thus 
became subject, autonomous, was expressed as the peculiar self-consciousness 
of modern man. On the connection between external religious event, philo-
sophical principle and the emergence of the Modern Age Hegel declares:  
Es ist ein groβer Eigensinn, der Eigensinn, der dem Menschen Ehre macht, nichts in 
der Gesinnung anerkennen zu wollen, was nicht durch den Gedanken gerechtfertigt 
ist, - und dieser Eigensinn ist das Characteristische der neueren Zeit, ohnehin das ei-
gentümliche Prinzip des Protestantismus. (Hegel (1970c) 27). 
It is not quite clear whether Hegel also ascribes to Christianity the honour 
of the turn to the subject which characterises the epistemological foundational-
ism emerging in early modern philosophy. The explicit demand that science 
must be based on self-evident principles is in Descartes connected with the 
notion of the subject. The idea “I think” as principle was absent in Greek phi-
losophy. This novelty expressed the new knowledge of the actuality of the in-
dubitable, inner reality of the I as subject. It is implied by this theory that the 
mental as a self-contained sphere is divided from the external world. As a sub-
stance it exists independently of the world, though not of God who is its formal 
cause. But regardless of foundationalism and the historical roots of idea of the 
subject, there is a coincidence between the origin of modern epistemology and 
the Christian impact on the practical philosophy which began to develop from 
the beginning of the modern age: The new idea of freedom became the basis 
of the new leading, classic theories of natural law and political contract theories 
as well as of the later moral philosophy of Kant. 
 
8. The continuity in the history of philosophy and the Modern Age as a break. 
Hegel’s view of the relation between philosophy and religion attracts interest, 
partly because the impact of Christianity on philosophy seems to imply a break 
with the otherwise continuous development of philosophy, partly because the 
principles of individual freedom and human dignity do not spring from reason 
itself, but originated in an external historical event. More precisely, the question 
is whether the Christian revelation had simply been the necessary input for the 
development of the modern world. As mentioned, in Hegel’s view religion and 
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philosophy share the same object – God, the absolute or the Notion – but they 
differ as regards the form in which it is approached in the two fields (Hegel 
(1971a) 81-82). The Christian idea of the appearance of the eternal in finite 
human shape corresponds to philosophy striving to bring about the identifica-
tion of the divine with man by appropriating the truth through rational thinking. 
Faith must be transformed into knowledge in order to complete the process. 
Consequently, the historical movement conceived of as the development of the 
knowledge of truth in history should be comprehended as the mediation of the 
eternal with the finite consciousness. Hegel considers the progress in the 
knowledge of freedom and human dignity in the form of the Reformation and 
the French Revolution as testimonies that this mediation has taken place (Hegel 
(1970d) 539-540); (1969) 88). The Christian paradox is not incomprehensible, 
it imposes a task on the philosopher to mediate the eternal with the finite by 
virtue of dialectical thought. The history of modern philosophy is the decisive 
demonstration of the historicity of this truth. 
It is up to theological research to decide on Hegel’s claim that the history 
of philosophy will do as a proof of the reconciliation of the world with the 
divine being (Hegel (1971a) 127). But the significance Hegel ascribes to philos-
ophy in this respect raises the problem how the history of philosophy can be 
considered a process that evolves due to internal conditions of reason when – 
at least partly - it is driven by external influence. As demonstrated, it was the 
political consequences of a historical event which lay the foundation of philos-
ophy in ancient Greece. And furthermore, basic principles of modern reasoning 
in at least the moral and political philosophy of the Modern Age cannot be 
explained without reference to the Christian revelation. This relation of philos-
ophy to external historical events needs a clarification through Hegel’s notion 
of revelation. To Hegel revelation means an essential truth about man which 
cannot be reached by philosophical reasoning alone. But even so, transformed 
into philosophical form Revelation as a historical fact has achieved the status 
of an a priori knowledge which functions as the foundation of practical philo-
sophical reasoning. Revelation is not just the transcendent object of religious 
faith. Correctly considered it is a knowledge which had profound significance 
for man’s view of himself and his existence. Revelation in general means an 
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immediate appearance of truth (ibid. 92). In pre-Christian religions it was given 
as natural phenomena, e.g. the burning bush, but finally it has appeared in the 
‘word’, logos. This is the complete revelation since a truth about man, a spiritual 
truth, only finds its complete form in linguistic form, i.e. when spirit communi-
cates with spirit.  
It is significant for the communication of the truth through revelation that 
by the thoughtful appropriation of the Word – logos - the individual does not 
just know of God. He also reflects himself in the message of Christ. The Word 
provides man with a new and deeper self-knowledge in accordance with the 
higher origin of Christ. This identification with the divine being14 is the purpose 
of the revelation and it establishes the foundation of the reconciliation of the 
eternal with the finite being. The individual – ‘subjective spirit’ – is then called 
upon to accomplish the reconciliation by shaping a secular world on the basis 
of the truth revealed to the world. To be specific, it is in the spirit of revelation 
that humanity should liberate itself from all external worldly authority, including 
the power of the church, and shape a new world – the sphere of ‘objective spirit’ 
– from the philosophical reason which is renewed by revelation. Man must ac-
tualise his freedom and dignity in accordance with his essence thus known. - It 
is a difficult but decisive point in Hegel that Christianity does not lead to sub-
mission and humility. On the contrary, the self-reflection of the individual in 
the God-man is a knowledge which liberates the mind from suppressive au-
thorities by providing new ideas for modern practical philosophy. Hegel states 
this complex conception clearly in the following sentence:  
Wenn in der Religion als solcher der Mensch das Verhältnis zum absoluten Geiste als 
sein Wesen weiβ, so hat er weiterhin den göttlichen Geist auch als in die Sphäre der 
weltlichen Existenz tretend gegenwärtig, als die Substanz des States, der Familie usw. 
(Hegel (1970b) 302).  
Thus, man is known as essentially infinite, free, and autonomous. The estab-
lishing of the individual as subject which follows from this process has far-reach-
ing consequences. It implies that man must shape his freedom in the world 
through political institutions in which he can educate and reflect himself, his 
 
14 Hegel speaks about the unity of man and God. He remarks that it belongs to the concept of 
‘God’s son’ that man, the individual, is already contained in God; hence the possibility of the 
identification, cf. Hegel (1970d) 392) 
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freedom and dignity (Hegel (1791a 127). From the perspective of modern phi-
losophy, it is not difficult to see the effect which the Christian principles, free-
dom and dignity, have had on the shaping of the foundational principles of 
practical philosophy. And the change it brought about is exemplary for Hegel’s 
idea of the historicity of truth. 
The break with which the modern age commences confronts Hegel with 
the question of how to substantiate the claim that systematic philosophy and its 
history form a unity. One may expect that the entry of the idea of freedom on 
the scene of philosophy did not just initiate a manifold of new philosophical 
beginnings. It also brought an unruliness with it which threatened the idea of 
continuity and development. The rest of this paper is dedicated to the discus-
sion of this problem. In an attempt to save the continuity Hegel draws implicitly 
on the dialectic inherent in the metaphysical object of philosophy. As men-
tioned earlier, he names the ultimate object of philosophy God, the absolute 
idea or the Notion. As the quintessence and the principle of all beings this ob-
ject must be absolute. Furthermore, conceived as an abstract idea as the abso-
lute was in the first scattered and vague conceptions in pre-Socratic philosophy 
it had the character of universal being, purely and simply. It was abstract, with-
out specific content. But the object of philosophy conceived of as the universal 
being is not truly absolute until it exists both as an idea and as reality. To be 
precise: it only completes itself as absolute if it can be shown that the outer 
reality, the world, is not a limit but rather the condition of its reality. Conse-
quently, it follows from the concept of the absolute that it confirms its all com-
prehensive reality as an active principle in the world by mediating the universal 
with the particular. As eternal the principle must specify by unfolding in the 
medium of time. It must leave off its originally abstract character, go down into 
the finite world, only in order to rise again in the process whose purpose is the 
realisation of the idea. In other word: it must make history.  
It follows from Hegel’s theory that a kind of freedom is at play in the 
manifold of the philosophical systems. It shows in the independence which the 
philosopher achieves when he thinks for himself.  Each philosophical system is a 
free product of an individual intellect. But given the autonomy of the individual 
as subject, the possibility arises that a manifold of systems can develop into 
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mutually conflicting systems and movements based on more or less arbitrary 
assumptions and agendas. This was the situation in the philosophy after Hegel. 
In the light of the loss of unity which philosophy experienced after Hegel, his 
confidence in a unitary development of its history does not seem quite convinc-
ing. Hegel substantiated his idea of a unitary philosophy in the manifold of its 
expressions by applying the principle of organic development in nature to his 
idea of history. In historical retrospect he considered the history of philosophy 
one of several manifestations of what he calls: 
eine Idee im Ganzen und in allen ihren Gliedern, wie im einem lebendigen Individuum 
ein Leben, ein Puls durch alle Glieder schlägt. Alle in ihr hervortretenden Teilen und 
die Systematisation derselben geht aus der einen Idee hervor; alle diese Besonderheiten 
sind nur Spiegel und Abbilder dieser einen Lebendigkeit (…) (ibid. 47). 
More precisely, the variety of philosophical systems, often even mutually irrec-
oncilable, are necessary for the manifestation of absolute truth in the minds of 
human beings. As stated previously, metaphysical truth is not a distant and in-
accessible object of knowledge. It appears, lives and confirms its reality in the 
mind of the individuals who provide it with a certain shape and a specific ep-
ochal character. 
Hegel’s confidence that reason governs history needs further justification. 
In fact, it is a weakness that he seems to fasten only on one aspect of the 
thought, namely that reason unites the individual with the universal reason 
which binds the variety of philosophical systems together over time. He does 
not ascribe sufficient significance to the consequences of the simple fact that to 
think is to think for oneself. When reason becomes aware of itself it loosens the 
individual subject from tradition and centers it in itself. Self-consciousness im-
plies detachment. I suggest that Hegel’s idea that philosophical work reflects 
and preserves its whole history together with his idea of ‘self-conscious reason’ 
resulting from the laborious work of the predecessors should therefore rather 
be considered as a call on the philosopher to show historical awareness than be 
taken as a convincing argument for the necessary historical coherence in history. 
It is a false alternative either to accept the ‘thoughtful consideration’ and con-
ceive oneself a participant in the “holy chain” of history (ibid. 21) or to deny 
truth simply and purely like Pilatus did vis-á-vis Jesus (ibid. 32-33). The denial 
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of tradition in favour of an insistence on thinking for oneself is not necessarily 
an expression of “subjective vanity” as Hegel thought it was. On the contrary, 
pluralism is a real possibility even though the integration of tradition in system-
atic philosophy can only qualify the conceptual content in philosophical rea-
soning. Our contemporary age which displays a diversified landscape consisting 
of mutually more or less independent traditions and movements within philos-
ophy can easily live up to the demand of integrating tradition without displaying 
a unified philosophy. 
It may seem too easy to criticize Hegel’s idea of a unitary history of phi-
losophy in the light of a 20th century characterised by a diversity of movements 
and single trendsetting philosophers. But also, an immanent criticism might be 
directed against Hegel when he applied his metaphysics of organicism on his-
torical matters (ibid. 30-40). It is reasonable to doubt that the necessity of nat-
ural organic development pertains to the historical process as well. Certainly, 
both nature and history share the essential property of life. But history is fur-
thermore distinguished by freedom. It can give rise to wonder why Hegel did 
not draw a clear distinction between the realms of nature and of spirit here 
when he did elsewhere by emphasizing the distinction of the human world as 
the sphere of freedom. History – the living developing world of mankind – is 
an expression of Geist and thereby based on the free will (Hegel (1970c) 46-48). 
By contrast, necessity governs the natural world. 
However, according to Hegel freedom is not in conflict with necessity. 
The course of the world history is governed by the law of the realisation of 
freedom. And as a subdivision philosophy keeps its unity in its historical change 
by virtue of the temporal development of man’s cognition of the absolute. He-
gel’s presentation of the history of philosophy thus becomes a variant of the 
theodicé by virtue of which he elsewhere defends his teleological view of the 
world history (Hegel (1975d) 35, 540). Freedom does not amount to anarchy 
and irrationality. Freedom in philosophical thinking too is necessary for the uni-
versal truth to become concrete, living and actual in the mind of individuals. 
Truth descends to man by becoming the living presence of the driving force in 
the course of history. Just like the world history is a slaughter (ibid. 540) on 
which the happiness of individuals and people are sacrificed for the sake of 
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progression in the awareness of freedom, so, strictly speaking, Hegel considers 
the history of philosophy the history of philosophical mistakes when as isolated 
systems they make claim to contain absolute truth. But in historical retrospect 
they can be considered relative truths which constitute moments in the progress 
of philosophy’s overall striving to reach and express an adequate notion of the 
absolute. - Yet this presupposes that the life of philosophy is essentially similar 
to an organism, whose parts all unify to form one and the same individual or-
ganism which actualises itself through these same parts. However, it could be 
objected that a crucial difference pertains between on the one side an organism 
and its parts and on the other side the eternal truth and its single dedicated 
practitioners. 
 
9. Historicity and teleology. The beginning and the end. 
Hegel’s teleological-metaphysical historiography implies that the history of phi-
losophy metaphorically spoken forms a circle. Its development is complete 
when the end unites with the beginning and marks the actualisation of a poten-
tiality. Regardless of the unanswered question of how philosophy will develop 
in the future, it follows from this theory that all present philosophy presupposes 
the tradition. To do genuine philosophy thus demands accounting for parts of 
the history of philosophy which are relevant to the subject matter. Hegel 
demonstrated historical awareness in his political philosophy by considering the 
emergence of the notion of universal freedom in history not just a break with 
tradition but a necessity for the development of absolute knowledge. His polit-
ical philosophy is based on the idea that the modern world is characterised by 
a divide (Entzweiung)15, a separation of the individual from the community as a 
necessary step towards more freedom and individualism. As is well known, He-
gel considered it a substantial task for practical philosophy to form a theory that 
unified individual freedom with the life in the community (Hegel (1970e) 20-
 
15 In his early writings Hegel explained the origin of his contemporary philosophy from the di-
vide that characterised his age. The loss of the ‘power of social coherence’ in the modern world 
gave rise to a need for a philosophy capable of reconciliating the oppositions of for example the 
individual and society, cf. Hegel (1970e) 21-22 ff.). In his Philosophy of Right he calls civil so-
ciety the divide in ethical life. Nevertheless, civil society is relatively justified as an integrate 
sphere of the state. The latter administers the interests of both individuals and the community, 
cf. Hegel (1970c) 87, § 33).   
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22). What was needed was a change of the traditional concept of freedom as 
independence to mean self-realisation in communion with others. The unification 
of individuals implied an idea of society where the others are not limits but 
positive conditions of the fulfilment of one’s own freedom. Thus, negative free-
dom must be weighed against a positive aspect16. Hegel’s modification of the 
concept of freedom testifies of the influence which the ethical spirit of Greek 
philosophy had on his philosophy. The integration of the ancient notion of 
cosmic order as a positive, unifying aspect was supposed to be the constructive 
element in Hegel’s diagnosis of his own age which he considered threatened by 
social atomisation. This critical theory thus presupposed a historical perspective 
in which the present age was seen in the light of its development from the an-
cient Greek spirit. The divide in modern ethical life (Sittlichkeit) was a break with 
tradition which was justified because it brought about the emancipation which 
distinguishes the modern world.  
The application of ancient Greek political spirit to solve the problem of 
the divide in the modern world is a double reflection. It forms a circle where 
the end has united with the beginning once the reunification is complete. In 
methodical respect the dialectic of the unity-in-the-divide ascribes to the phi-
losopher the task of addressing a philosophical problem with historical aware-
ness and of integrating the past in his present attempt to solve the problem. 
Having the ancient Greek spirit in view and on the basis of the principle that a 
present philosophy must be a mirror of the whole history of philosophy, Hegel 
laid the foundation of his well-known criticism of the classical, liberal concept 
of negative freedom. He attempted to reestablish the ancient notion of cosmic 
order on the conditions of the present age. - However, it is worth noticing that 
Hegel formed his theory of ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit) by virtue of an original anal-
ysis of the modern civil society. Apart from the dividing tendencies of the free 
market, modern society must show inherent socially unifying features as well. 
In view of the drawbacks of modern individualism and with the ancient Greek 
city state as a model, Hegel’s theory of the modern state is built on an exami-
nation of elements of freedom and community in the civil society of his age. 
 
16 In the introduction to his Philosophy of Right Hegel develops his concept of freedom as a 
unity of a negative and a positive aspect. 
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Both elements are unified to form the dialectical moments in his notion of the 
“actuality of freedom” as self-realisation. It is not wide off the mark to say that 
the circular movement between history and the present age which Hegel under-
takes to complete in order to deal with practical philosophy, is unfolded as an 
attempt to renew Aristotle’s notion of the good life in the community as the 
ultimate purpose of man’s endeavour, combined with Kant’s doctrine of the 
autonomy of reason17. 
Regardless of the productive potential in Hegel’s metaphysical notion of 
the history of philosophy and his insistence on historical awareness, given the 
significance of the two previously described external influences the question of 
the internal development in philosophy ought still to be addressed. As we have 
seen, historicity seems to mean markings in the continuous stream of historical 
change due to the driving force inherent in the philosophical reason itself. He-
gel’s history of philosophy belongs to the category of problem-oriented presen-
tations which explains the development of philosophy from a core of relatively 
stable questions and arguments18. However, it is a problem that Hegel himself 
stresses the dependence of the new beginnings on an external geo-political and 
on a spiritual (religious) event. The Christian Revelation in particular is explicitly 
a radical transcendent intervention which brings with it a change in philosoph-
ical reasoning as such, at least at the foundation of practical philosophy. 
It can hardly be denied that Hegel’s view of the radical influence of a reli-
gious event does have relativistic consequences for the relation between the 
history of philosophy and the external historical conditions. According to He-
gel, God’s appearance in history was an objective, epoch-making event which in-
fluenced the individual as subjectivity. Man’s renewed self-knowledge as a subject 
which arose from the personal appropriation of the doctrine of revelation, 
namely the knowledge of the idea of man’s infinite freedom and dignity, was 
meant to emancipate mankind from the authority of theology. It exposed the 
new reality of modern institutions which should be based on practical reason 
renewed by the spirit of Christianity. From a modern perspective, the 
knowledge of this significant change implied the new epistemic condition that 
 
17 Cf. Wood (1993) 21 ff. 
18 Cf. Passmore (1967) on the historiography of philosophy, especially his categorisation of He-
gel’s work. 
59 
modern man can no longer approach truth in a ‘naïve’ objectivistic way like the 
ancient Greeks did. Man, as cognising subject does not unite with the highest, 
divine being through abstract thinking alone. An attempt to do so by imitating 
the Neoplatonic realisation of bliss by merging with the divine by virtue of the 
intellect would probably have the abstract character which the divine has for 
the subject, who simply contemplates the divine principle in thought. It be-
comes nothing more than thought. It is more likely that an authentic approach 
to the truth in the modern world consists in the intellectual and personal acqui-
sition of the truth in the ethical life in institutions which are just and based on 
the notion of man’s freedom and dignity. Thus, in a further historical view, the 
reconciliation of the secular world with the new spirit (Hegel (1971a) 127) 
through the realisation of freedom would be the triumph of the idea in history, 
the confirmation of its absolute power. Not as an ascent to the absolute, rather 
only as the unification of the eternal being with the finite world can what the 
Greeks addressed as universal ‘being’ be known in its concrete shape, i.e. as the 
truly absolute.  
It is obvious to ascribe the conviction to Hegel that the truth of philoso-
phy can only be known through the history of philosophy by means of Christi-
anity. It is precisely the incarnation that takes away the abstract, intellectualistic 
character from the idea of the universal being in Greek philosophy. Through 
the incarnation the divine being appears in the historical movement and mani-
fests as the progress in the awareness of freedom and in appropriate innova-
tions of political institutions. At the same time, it is the historical movement 
which according to Hegel’s historiography of philosophy confirms the absolute 
character of the universal being which the Greeks only could approach intellec-
tually. However, as argued I think this questions Hegel’s theory of the history 
of philosophy as an immanent philosophical development. One could defend 
Hegel by referring to the often cited statement that the development of the 
awareness of freedom happens in phases: “Im Orient ist nur ein einziger Frei 
(der Despot), in Griechenland sind Einige frei, im germanischen Leben gilt der 
Satz, es sind Alle frei, d.h. der Mensch als Mensch ist frei” (ibid. 122). Further-
more, historicity, which was first applied to denote the birth of philosophy in 
ancient Greece refers, as it were, to the political freedom won through struggle. 
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It constituted the basis of the freedom of thought, self-aware thinking. Differ-
ent cultural spheres demonstrate different degrees of freedom. 
However, the defence does not seem to hold. This is because elsewhere 
Hegel points to an essential difference between the idea of freedom in different 
cultural spheres. The adequate and true notion of freedom is only connected 
with the Christian spirit in the historical fact that man becomes free as man 
(ibid. 127) and not just by means of citizenship, social status or ethnic origin 
(Hegel (1970b) 301-302) as in other cultures, including the ancient Greek city 
states. It follows that Hegel stuck to the idea of an external influence. The con-
cept of freedom of the Modern Ages differs radically from the ideas of freedom 
in other cultures. In the Orient, for example, where only the monarch enjoyed 
political freedom, only negative freedom of the mind existed in general. Hegel 
even warned against cultivating the tendency inherent in the Indian, negative 
freedom to degenerate into political fanatism. The rejection of all physical in-
stitutions can deteriorate into annihilation of the established societal order (He-
gel (1970c) 50, § 5A). 
The modern notion of true freedom is essentially positive; it is active and 
contains a potential for political change. It consists in a confirmation of the 
infinite dignity of every single human being and the right to realize one’s free-
dom in the community. Freedom is no inner, passive state of distance to the 
external world. On the contrary, it is an outwardly directed movement, a shap-
ing of a society in which the individual can realize itself: become for-it-self what 
it is in-itself (Hegel (1970b) § 482A). Hegel calls the totality of political institu-
tions “das Reich der verwirklichten Freiheit” (Hegel (1970c) 46 § 4). The notion 
of freedom in the modern world weighs both the negative and the positive, 
active aspect; together they form the conception of self-realisation in a world 
based on freedom. The freedom of the modern world is thus historically unique. 
 
10. Hegel and radical historicity. 
Hegel’s claim of historicity with regard to historical events that changed epis-
temic conditions was not inconsistent with the idea of the universal validity of 
philosophical reason. But the historicity of metaphysical truth implied a pro-
ductive new departure for modernity, according to which truth could no longer 
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be known adequately on the conditions of ancient Greek intellectuality. More 
precisely, from the perspective of the Modern Age we know that the highest 
object of philosophical knowledge, the absolute idea, cannot be grasped ade-
quately as eternal, immutable being. It is implied by the dialectical structure of 
the development of the absolute in the historical process that it must unfold as 
self-aware reason in the individual person. The philosopher himself as individ-
ual subject is involved in the theoretical self-completion of the absolute which 
shows gradually in the series of systems that constitute the history of philoso-
phy. It is the divinity which must renounce its own transcendent status by de-
scending to the temporal sphere in the incarnation and next complete the his-
torical process by conveying the principle of freedom to the world. 
Historicity in the sense which it received later in Heidegger and Gadamer 
is devoid of the metaphysical foundation and teleology which it had in Hegel. 
But this refutation was not new. Already the criticism of Hegel in the late 19th 
century rejected Hegel’s teleological idea of history. The idea was this: if all hu-
man phenomena must be considered on the basis of their historical context, 
this must also pertain to man as a subject of cognition. As a consequence, 
knowledge is historically conditioned. If cognition thus means “die geschicht-
liche Seinsweise des menschlichen Geistes” (Renthe-Fink (1974) 405), the his-
toriography of philosophy must include the historian’s reflection of himself as 
a “geschichtlich wissendes existierendes” (ibid.). This means that Hegel’s idea 
of philosophical cognition is relativised to what its historical conditions permits 
it to know. Instead of ‘thoughtful consideration’ (denkende Vernunft) historical 
facticity becomes the fundamental epistemic condition. This radical, epistemo-
logical shift implies limitations, but also new possibilities19 explored in the phil-
osophical hermeneutics and its tradition. 
By contrast, Hegel did not question the universality of philosophical rea-
son. But even on Hegel’s own premises it must be evident that the external 
influence on philosophy which distinguished the Modern Age from Antiquity 
had substantial implications, at least for the foundation of practical philosophy. 
The ‘free spirit’ in which the modern world was proclaimed did not base moral 
 
19 Dilthey who was the first to launch a theory of historicity reduced the history of philosophy to 
a typology of world views that express the personality of their authors and their historical expe-
riences. 
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and political philosophy on a cosmological or theological order but on the es-
sential freedom of man. As we have seen, in modern philosophy reason works 
from other principles than in Antiquity. - However, it is possible to point at a 
problem, probably unnoticed by Hegel himself. It appears in his attempts to 
integrate the history of philosophy in his own philosophy: Strongly aware of 
the historicity of philosophy, Hegel considered the modern age an integrated 
phase in the whole history of philosophy. As shown above, in this historical 
perspective the age is characterised by a ‘divide’ (Entzweiung) which calls for a 
unifying countermeasure inspired by the ancient Greek notion of community. 
Nevertheless, Hegel construed his theory of community on the basis of the 
principles of the modern world itself, namely on the idea of freedom in modern 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Justice in modern age differs significantly from Plato’s 
cosmological notion. In Hegel’s political philosophy which is based on the idea 
of the realisation of freedom there is not much left of the spirit of the Athenian 
state. The primary task which Hegel undertook to solve in his political philos-
ophy was to investigate the specifically modern notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
in the modern state which has the civil society (the free market) as a relatively 
independent sphere. It was crucial for him to demonstrate that modern civil 
society was not just a sphere of divide but also contained socially unifying rela-
tions. Thus, in Hegel’s political philosophy modern society turned out to be not 
a total break with but rather a completion of the idea of a comprehensive com-
munity since it integrates freedom as a principle. Hegel’s idea of Sittlicheit thus 
differs significantly from the ethics of the ancient Greek city state which had 
no place for the idea of universal individual freedom20. 
With Hegel’s appropriation of the idea of the ancient Greek community 
in view, it is obvious that the change which the notion of a past age must un-
dergo through the interpretation from the perspective of a later age on the his-
torical conditions of the later age, happens on a hermeneutic condition that 
follows from the historicity of the scholar. With this epistemic limitation in 
mind Hegel says that the individual cannot ‘transcend’ its own world, the hori-
zon of its thinking, just as the individual cannot jump over its time (Hegel 
 
20 In his comparison of the modern state with the ancient Greek city state he considered Plato’s 
Republic an exemplary expression of Greek ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit). See the “Preface” of the 
Philosophy of Right. 
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(1970c) 26). This statement would be a confession to the philosophical herme-
neutics of Gadamer. However, Hegel weighed the historical relativity of the 
subject against the relation which the subject has to the absolute truth by means 
of reason. Thus, it must be kept in mind that Hegel’s concept of historicity does 
not pertain to the ‘thoughtful consideration’ which philosophy performs. Hegel 
never questioned the universal validity of reason. ‘Historicity’ here refers to the 
idea of freedom and its objective manifestation in time as a history-making 
event. This is inconsistent with philosophical hermeneutics, i.e. with Gadamer’s 
existential-ontological foundation of historicity, since the latter implies a radical 
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